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1. Introduction 
    Expected utility maximization is based on behavioral assumptions having strong 
normative support, as in Bayesian econometrics.  But as a descriptive model of 
rational behavior by consumers, the growing field of behavioral economics widely 
rejects expected utility maximization.1 We consider monetary aggregation theory 
under non-expected utility and derive the model implications for monetary asset 
user costs and optimal portfolio selection, when agents are uncertainty averse. 
Specifically, under non-expected utility maximization, we permit consumers’ 
subjective probability distributions under uncertainty to be inconsistent with linear 
probabilistic additivity. In contrast most economists assume that subjective 
probabilities must sum to one, as a normative representation of how rational 
consumers “should behave,” although that assumption is inconsistent with findings 
in the behavioral economics literature about how consumers actually behave.  
We use the term uncertainty, as opposed to risk, since we do not assume that 
the objective probability distribution is known to the consumer.  To be consistent 
with the relevant literature, we also assume that the utility function, in a dynamical 
context, exhibits a recursive structure: current period utility depends on expected 
future utility as well as on current consumption. Under the assumption that this 
recursive dependence is separable, the non-expected utility we use is expected utility 
under a nonadditive probability measure.  The resulting model aims to separate the 
more subtle "uncertainties" from quantifiable "risk." The objective of this paper is to 
unravel the implications of monetary aggregation theory, when consumers’ behavior 
deviates from expected utility maximization.  
The literature on monetary services aggregation derived from aggregation 
theory began with Barnett (1978, 1980).  The resulting literature separates the 
investment motive from the services motive, when monetary assets yield interest as 
well as providing monetary services. If the interest rates paid to monetary asset 
                                                             
11 The central role in behavioral economics of non-expected utility maximization has been emphasized by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky and Kahneman (1992), and Thaler (1993).  Also see Grabisch (1996) and 
Chateauneuf and Cohen (2010), among many others. 
holders were a monetary service, then coal mines, real estate, and the entire capital 
stock of the country would be money.   
That literature was subsequently extended to include risk by Poterba and 
Rotemberg (1987) and Barnett (1995), when current period interest is not known 
until the end of the period.  Barnett, Liu, and Jensen (1997) further extended to the 
case of CCAPM (consumption capital asset pricing) and subsequently by Barnett and 
Wu (2005), who extended to the case of  intertemporal nonseparability providing 
larger risk adjustments than produced by CCAPM.  Recently, Keating and Smith 
(2018) explore the usefulness of aggregation theoretic monetary aggregates in Taylor 
rules policies in the framework of a rational expectations model.2 
    We permit the possibility that consumers’ behavior might deviate from 
expected utility maximization. Monetary assets are durable goods and thus have user 
cost prices. Deriving those user costs is a fundamental step in producing monetary 
aggregates from economic aggregation theory.  As a result, our research begins by 
determining the implications of non-expected utility for the user costs of monetary 
assets.  
The expected utility of von Neumann and Morgenstern received axiomatic 
support from Savage (1954), using a prior subjective probability that sums up to one. 
The Savage axioms and the resulting expected utility maximization imputed to 
consumers have been building blocks of many economic models. Yet Allais (1953) 
and the Ellsberg (1961) paradox find that human being's behavior frequently falls 
outside the prediction of expected utility. One group of models, seeking to generalize 
expected utility theory, distinguishes between risk and uncertainty, as defined by 
Knight (1921) and further developed by Bewley (2002).  In that literature, risk exists 
when economic agents know the objective probabilities, which do sum to one.  
Under uncertainty, the objective probabilities are not known to economic agents, 
and the resulting behavior of economic agents need not be representable by a 
subjective probability distribution, having the same measure theoretic properties of 
                                                             
2 Other important contributions to this literature include Barnett (2012), Barnett and Chauvet (2011), Barnett, 
Keating, and Kelly (2011), Belongia and Chalfant (1989), Barnett and Ireland (2014; 2015a,b;2016), Serletis and 
Gogas (2014), and Serletis and Rahman (2013).  
the unknown objective probability distribution. Although the subjective joint 
probability of the union of all possible outcomes is necessarily one, the sum of the 
probabilities of each of those independent, separate outcomes is not necessarily 
one.3 
We follow that approach. In particular, the model we use is built on a 
nonadditive probability measure. This approach has its foundations in Schmeidler's 
findings: if probabilities reflect people's willingness to bet, those probabilities need 
not be additive. An axiomatic treatment of nonadditive probability models can be 
found in Schmeidler (1986, 1989), Gilboa (1987, 2009), and Gilboa and Schmeidler 
(1989).  While this approach does not capture all of the objections to expected 
utility maximization in the behavioral economics literature, this generalization does 
permit a formal mathematical solution producing an elegant generalization to 
expected utility maximization under weaker assumptions than the Savage axioms 
and is consistent with Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) approach. 
    We find that nonadditive probability measure yields boundaries to the user cost 
of monetary assets, depending on whether the marginal utility and rate of return are 
comonotonic or countermonotonic. This does not mean, however, that user costs 
under nonadditive expectation are only subject to inequality constraints. If there 
exists an underlying probability measure to properly define the nonadditive 
probabilities, we find that the user cost has a rank-dependent expected utility 
representation. This solution has an expected utility form, but uses transformed 
distorted additive probabilities as weights. The rank dependence is much less 
restrictive than might appear to be the case, since there is always a permutation to 
line up the objective function in an ascending/descending order.  
We also find that under optimality there is a user cost interval within which the 
agent will not hold any position in the monetary asset. When the user cost is below 
the lower limit of this interval, she will want to buy more of the monetary asset. 
When the user cost is above the upper limit of this interval, she will want to sell the 
                                                             
3 For a formal definition of nonadditive probability, see the first paragraph of section 2.1 below. 
monetary asset (short). The two limits of this interval constitute the reserve prices 
for transactions, if the agent's belief reflects uncertainty aversion. This result does 
not hinge on her attitude towards risk. Our model thus is capable of explaining why 
there are situations under which people are not active in changing their monetary 
asset portfolios. A reasonable individual may not behave consistently with Savage's 
model. Maximizing utility under a nonadditive prior can provide a useful rationale for 
observed behavior in the market. When probabilities become additive, the model 
reduces to von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility case.  The existing 
publications on monetary aggregation under risk become special cases of our 
analysis and hence are formally nested within our theory. 
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the 
model and the associated nonadditive probability measure, solve for the user cost 
under uncertainty aversion, and derive the user cost boundaries. In section 3 we find 
the conditions under which the user cost has a rank-dependent expected utility 
representation. In section 4 we consider the consumer's problem from an asset 
pricing perspective and demonstrate our main theorem providing the user cost 
interval within which no trade will happen. As a side note, we prove the conditions 
under which Jensen's inequalities will hold under nonadditive priors. In section 5 we 
conclude the paper. The appendix contains the mathematical proofs of theorems and 
useful lemmas. 
 
2. The Model 
 
2.1. Utility Function and Uncertainty Averse 
 
When we say the probability is nonadditive, we mean that if A and B are two 
disjoint events in the sample space Ω ,  such that A B∪ = Ω , with their 
probabilities being ( )v A  and ( )v B  respectively, then ( ) ( ) 1v A v B+ ≠  , although
( ) 1v A B∪ = . As explained below, uncertainty aversion will imply ( ) ( ) 1v A v B+ < . 
Under a nonadditive probability measure, the proper way to define an integral is no 
longer Riemann but Choquet.  Under these conditions, Riemann integration suffers 
from discontinuity, nonmonotonicity, and ambiguity (dependence upon the form of 
the utility function). Suppose there is a function 0f ≥ . Then the Choquet (1954) 
integral integrates over rectangles horizontally: 
( )
0
| ( ) ,fdv v s f s t dt
∞
= ≥∫ ∫  
where the right hand side is a standard Riemann integral.4 The Choquet integral has 
many attractive properties, such as reflecting linear translations multiplied by a 
positive coefficient. But generally it is not additive, unless the functions under 
evaluation are comonotonic, a property that will be relevant to some of our results 
below. 
    Under uncertainty, the utility function under our consideration is in the 
form of nonexpected utility as follows: 
 ( ) ( )1 1, , , ,Ct t t t t t t tV U c E V u c V dv+ += = + ∫m m β   (1) 
where tc  is the date t consumption of goods, mt  is the vector of monetary assets, 
and 1
C
t tE V +  is expected future utility, conditional on all information at time t.5 We 
use a superscript C on the expectation operator to denote Choquet expectation. In 
this uncertainty context, ( )U ⋅  is the aggregator function through which current 
consumption, all monetary assets, and expected future utility are aggregated. We 
follow canonical macroeconomic models to allow time separability, where β is the 
subjective discount factor and 1tV +  is tomorrow's utility in each of tomorrow's states. 
Without the separability assumption, the discount factor would be the derivative of 
( )U ⋅  with respect to its third argument.  
                                                             
4 For a more formal, but conveniently accessible, definition and discussion of Choquet integration, see its 
Wikipedia entry at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Choquet_integral. 
5 Distinguishing attitudes towards risk from behavior towards intertemporal substitution is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Once we include monetary assets in the utility function, the effects of Epstein and Zin (1989) or Weil’s 
(1990) generalized isoelastic utility are much harder to find. But it could be a topic worth pursuing. 
We further assume there exists a linearly homogenous aggregator function, 
( )mt tM M= , such that: 
 ( ) ( ), , .  t t t tc F cu M=   m m   (2) 
In this paper, additive probability is denoted by P , while capacity (nonadditive 
probability or “charge”) is denoted by v , so that ( )dv⋅∫ is the Choquet integral. 
More formally, suppose that S  is a finite set of states of nature, and in every 
period there are a finite number of n different states. Let ℱ be the σ-algebra 
generated by the events on S . Then capacity 𝑣𝑣 on a measurable space (S,ℱ) is a 
real-valued set function 𝑣𝑣: ℱ→[0,1], such that 𝑣𝑣(φ)=0, 𝑣𝑣(S)=1, and 𝑣𝑣(𝑆𝑆) ≤ 𝑣𝑣(𝐵𝐵) 
for all A⊆B∈ℱ. An example of capacity could be v Pα= . In this case, α  measures 
the agent's attitude towards uncertainty. If 1α = , then capacity reduces to an 
additive prior probability measure. As this result illustrates, nonadditive probability 
reflects both the presence of uncertainty and the agent's attitude towards it.  
Using the example from the beginning of this section, 
( ) ( ) ( )1v A v B v A B+ < = ∪  is equivalent to concluding that the agent's decisions 
reflect uncertainty aversion.6 Schmeidler (1986, 1989) defines uncertainty aversion 
in terms of probability capacity by 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,v A v B v A B v A B+ ≤ ∪ + ∩   (3) 
although that definition is not universally accepted. That condition is also known as 
supermodularity, convexity, or 2-monotonicity of v . 
    The states of nature are a natural partition of the sample space S. If today's 
nature is denoted by s, we denote the state of nature tomorrow by s’. With a 
somewhat informal notation for V , it can be useful to rewrite the utility function (1) 
in terms of states for any given sequence, { } 0, ,
T
t t t
c
=
=X m  as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }10 0 1 1 1lim , , , .TT T s T sTV u c u c u c v ds v ds−→∞  = + + + ∫ ∫X m m m β β   (4) 
                                                             
6 We avoid use of the word "ambiguity," which is usually defined to mean that the agent vaguely perceives the 
probability of a particular state in a range. This possibility is outside the scope of this paper. 
This facilitates the calculation of Choquet integral using Riemann integrals. 
 
2.2. Equilibrium 
 
The agent holds two types of assets, monetary assets and nonmonetary assets.  
Nonmonetary assets provide only investment return, while monetary assets provide 
both investment return and monetary service flows, which we seek to measure. The 
budget constraints are 
 
1 1
L K
t t t t it t jt
i j
W p c p m p k
= =
= + +∑ ∑ ,  (5) 
 1 , 1 , 1 1
1 1
L K
t i t t it j t t jt t
i j
W R p m R p k y+ + + +
= =
= + +∑ ∑  ,  (6) 
where tW  is the agent's wealth in period t, tp  is the true cost of living index, tc  
is consumption of goods, and 1ty +  is income from all other sources, received at the 
beginning of t+1.  The variables, itm  and jtk , denote the quantities of monetary 
asset i and nonmonetary asset j respectively. The interest rate , 1i tR +  is the gross rate 
of return on monetary asset itm , while the interest rate , 1j tR +  is the gross return of 
nonmonetary asset jtk .  
Suppose L and K are the number of the two types of assets in the agent’s 
portfolio. Since nonmonetary assets do not provide service flows, other than their 
investment rates of return, it follows that R  is higher than R . Combining equation 
(5) and (6) yields the following flow of funds equation: 
 1 , 1 1 , 1
1 1
.
L K
t t it t i t t it jt t j t t jt t
i j
p c R p m p m R p k p k y− − − −
= =
  = − + − +   ∑ ∑    (7) 
Hence, the individual's consumption of goods is funded each period from the 
proceeds from rolling over the monetary assets and nonmonetary assets and from all 
other income. Note that equation (7) is the one used in Barnett (1980) and Barnett, 
Liu, and Jensen (1997) to facilitate comparison of our results with the existing 
literature. 
    The agent maximizes lifetime discounted utility (4), subjects to the flow of 
funds constraint (7). The resulting Bellman equation is: 
 
( )
{ }
( ) ( ) ( ){ }' 1
, ,
1 , 1 1 , 1
1 1
sup , '
. . .
t t t
s t t t s t s
c
L K
t t it t i t t it jt t j t t jt t
i j
V W u c V W v ds
s t p c R p m p m R p k p k y
+
− − − −
= =
= +
  = − + − +   
∫
∑ ∑
m k
m

β
  (8) 
Here ( )s tV W  denotes the Bellman value function. The agent is also subject to the 
following transversality condition: 
 
*
*
*lim 0,
t
tt
t
V W
W
β
→∞
∂
=
∂
  (9) 
with ∗ denoting the solution value from the optimization.  
After substituting from the Benveniste-Scheinkman equation, the first order 
conditions (Euler equations) with respect to consumption become 
 , 1
1 1
,C tt j t
t t t
pu uE R
c c p++ +
 ∂ ∂
=  ∂ ∂ 
β   (10) 
while the first order conditions with respect to monetary assets become 
 , 1
1 1
.C tt i t
it t t t
pu u uE R
m c c p++ +
 ∂ ∂ ∂
= −  ∂ ∂ ∂ 
β   (11) 
The contemporaneous real user-cost price of the services of monetary asset i is the 
marginal rate of substitution between the monetary asset and consumption, 
 
, 1 , 1
1 1 1
, 1 , 1
1 1 1
.
C Ct
t i t t i t
t t t t tit
it
C Ct
t j t t j t
t t t t
pu u u uu E R E r
c c p c cm
u pu uE R E rc c p c
+ +
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ − −   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂    = = =
∂    ∂ ∂
   ∂ ∂ ∂   


β β
π
β β
  (12) 
For notational convenience, we convert the nominal gross returns, , 1i tR +  and , 1j tR + , 
to the corresponding real gross rates of return, , 1 , 1
1
t
i t i t
t
pr R
p+ + +
= and , 1 , 1
1
t
j t j t
t
pr R
p+ + +
=  . 
Since the expectation ( )CtE ⋅ is not additive, it is the Choquet integral. 
    Also note that under the weak separability condition (2), we have 
 .t
it t it
Mu F
m M m
∂∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂ ∂
  
Substituting the definition of the user cost, we acquire: 
 .t tit
it
t
u
M c
Fm
M
π
∂
∂ ∂
=
∂∂
∂
  
Taking the total differential of the monetary aggregator function, ( )mt tM M= , 
yields 
 
1 1 1
log .
L L L
t t t
t it it it it it it
i i iit
t t
u u
M c cdM dm dm m d mF Fm
M M
π π
= = =
∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂
= = =
∂ ∂∂
∂ ∂
∑ ∑ ∑   (13) 
Since ( )mtM  is linearly homogenous of degree one, Euler’s theorem simplifies (13) 
to 
 
1 1
.
L L
t t
t it it it
i iit
t
u
M cM m mFm
M
π
= =
∂
∂ ∂
= =
∂∂
∂
∑ ∑   (14) 
Dividing equation (13) by (14) yields the Divisia index 
 
1
log log
L
t it it
i
d M s d m
=
=∑ ,  (15) 
where 
1
it it
it L
lt ltl
ms
m
π
π
=
=
∑
 is the user cost valued expenditure share. We conclude that 
the resulting Divisia quantity index is in exactly the same form as in Barnett (1980), 
with the only difference being that the user costs now are computed under a 
nonadditive probability measure. 
 
2.3. User-Cost Boundaries 
 We now return to the user-cost, itπ , in equation (12). Because the expectation 
is non-additive, we no longer have
( ), 1 , 1 , 1
1 1 1
, .t i t i t t t i t
t t t
u u uE r Cov r E E r
c c c+ + ++ + +
     ∂ ∂ ∂
= +    ∂ ∂ ∂     
 Instead, we have the 
following theorem: 
 
Theorem 1.  If , 1
1
, 0i t
t
u r
c ++
∂
≥
∂
  are comonotonic, then 
 ( ), 1 , 1
1 1
.C C Ct i t t t i t
t t
u uE r E E r
c c+ ++ +
   ∂ ∂
≥   ∂ ∂   
 (16) 
If v  is submodular, while 
1t
u
c +
∂
∂
 and , 1i tr +  are countermonotonic, then: 
 ( ), 1 , 1
1 1
.C C Ct i t t t i t
t t
u uE r E E r
c c+ ++ +
   ∂ ∂
≤   ∂ ∂   
  (17) 
The proof of this theorem is in the appendix.  
Comonotonicity is defined as follows. For every pair of states, s₁’, s₂’∈S, 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 , 1 1 , 1 2
1 1
' ' ' ' 0.i t i t
t t
u us s r s r s
c c + ++ +
 ∂ ∂
 − − ≥   ∂ ∂ 
  (18) 
Then the marginal utility and the rate of return increase or decrease at the same 
time. Countermonotonicity reverses the direction of the above inequality. Hence, 
under nonadditive probabilities, we do not have covariances, but we have 
inequalities. Equation (17) corresponds to uncertainty loving which is unusual and 
not the focus of this paper.7  
    Barnett, Liu, and Jensen (1997) proved, in their Theorem 1, that the user cost of 
                                                             
7 Although we do not consider uncertainty loving to be relevant monetary aggregation theory, there are 
circumstances under which it is not unreasonable. If we think about gain-loss asymmetry, when people 
particularly hate to lose what they have already had, such an extreme loss aversion might lead people to behave 
in an uncertainty loving way in the domain of losses. 
 
the services of monetary assets under risk aversion has an additional adjustment 
term not appearing in the risk free user cost. That adjustment term is about 
covariances, as in all CCAPM risk adjustments. The Barnett, Liu, and Jensen's risk 
adjusted user cost is a special case of our result. If the probability measure is additive, 
so that uncertainty is removed, risk aversion is all that is left. Then the Choquet 
expectation in equation (12) becomes the linearly additive expectation, and 
covariances appear.  
When the agent is not only risk averse but also uncertainty averse, then 
equation (12) cannot be further simplified by collecting covariances. We end up with 
inequalities giving rise to boundaries on user costs. In the next section, we will see 
that equality solutions do exist for , 1
1
C
t i t
t
uE r
c ++
 ∂
 ∂ 
, but those again hold as special 
cases of Choquet expectation. Our case nests Barnett, Liu and Jensen's (1997) result. 
If we further assume away both uncertainty aversion and risk aversion, we will have 
the perfect certainty case. Then equation (12) reduces to the user cost derived in 
Barnett (1980). 
    It is convenient to work on rates of returns, , 1i tr + , which are usually assumed to 
be stationary, so that taking averages is meaningful. But marginal utility, 
1t
u
c +
∂
∂ ,  
is not observed and difficult to estimate. Therefore we reinterpret equation (12) in 
terms of a stochastic discount factor, which, although still not observable, is much 
easier to estimate. We assume the agent has not passed the bliss point, so that 
0
t
u
c
∂ ≥∂ . Given date t information, uncertainty at time t has been resolved, and 
t
u
c
∂
∂  can be treated as a constant. By the positive homogeneity of Choquet 
integral, equation (12) can be written as 
 
1
, 1
1 , 1
1 , 11
, 1
1
1
,
C t
Ct i t
t t i tt
it C
C t t j tt
t j t
t
u cE r
E Q ru c
E Q ru cE r
u c
+
+
+ +
+ ++
+
 ∂ ∂
−    −∂ ∂   = =
   ∂ ∂   ∂ ∂ 


β
π
β
  (19) 
where we denote by 11 tt
t
u cQ
u c
β ++
∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂
 the pricing kernel. Note that from equation 
(10) and (11), we have respectively 
 1 , 11 ,
C
t t j tE Q r+ + =     (20) 
 1 , 11 .
C
it t t i tE Q r+ + = −  π   (21) 
Based on equation (19), a reinterpretation of Theorem 1 is that, if 1 , 1, 0t i tQ r+ + ≥  
and 1 , 1, 0t j tQ r+ + ≥ are both comonotonic, then: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 , 1
1 , 1
1
.
C C
t t t i t
it C C
t t t j t
E Q E r
E Q E r
+ +
+ +
−
≤

π   (22) 
If v  is submodular and 1tQ +  and the rate of return on both the monetary and 
non-monetary assets are countermonotonic, we have: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 , 1
1 , 1
1
.
C C
t t t i t
it C C
t t t j t
E Q E r
E Q E r
+ +
+ +
−
≥

π   (23) 
Since returns tend to move together, the dual satisfaction of comonotonic (or 
countermonotonic) with 1tQ + is not restrictive.  
Therefore when the probability measure is nonadditive, Choquet expectation 
produces boundaries to the user cost of monetary assets. More specifically, assume 
the real rates of return on both types of assets are positive and the substitution 
effect on intertemporal consumption dominates, so that the comonotonicity 
between 1tQ + and ( ), 1 , 1i t j tr r+ +  is satisfied. Then the calculated user cost should be 
lower than  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 , 1
1 , 1
1 C Ct t t i t
C C
t t t j t
E Q E r
E Q E r
+ +
+ +
−

. On the other hand, if the agent were 
uncertainty loving and the income effect dominates the intertemporal allocation of 
consumption, the countermonotonicity between 1tQ + and ( ), 1 , 1i t j tr r+ + is satisfied. 
Then any calculated user cost would be incorrect, if it were lower than 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 , 1
1 , 1
1 C Ct t t i t
C C
t t t j t
E Q E r
E Q E r
+ +
+ +
−

. 
  
3. Rank-Dependent Representation 
 
The existence of derived boundaries is not our only result under nonadditive 
probabilities. In this section we show that under some circumstances, there exists a 
linear solution for equation (21). Suppose ( )1 2, , ,P
T
nP P P=   is an additive 
probability vector satisfying 
1
1n ss P= =∑ , and suppose there is a probability measure 
μ such that for some nondecreasing function f: [0,1]→[0,1] with f(0)=0 and f(1)=1, 
the capacity v =f(μ) is well-defined. Then a new, additive, probability vector P↑ is 
permissible to order events as follows: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2
2 2 3 1
, , ,
1 , , , , .
P
T
n
T
s s s s n ns s s s n
P P P
f P f P f P f P f P f P
↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ −
=
 = − − − ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑


  (24) 
If the agent is uncertainty averse, ( )f ⋅  should be concave, so higher states are 
weighted less. Such a transformed probability could be tailored for accumulative 
lottery outcomes, where 1 nx x≤ ≤  in a lottery ( )1 1, ; ; , .n nx P x P  This 
observation is a reason we choose the notation↑ on the left side of equation (24). 
Take the distorted probability as an example, in which ( )f αµ µ= , where 
( )0,α ∈ +∞ , and µ  is the probability measure relative to which the additive 
probabilities sP  are given. Then ( ) ( )1 ,n nt s ss t s tP P P
α α
↑
= = +
= −∑ ∑  so that the above 
probability vector P↑  becomes 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 3 11 , , , , .P
T
s s s s n ns s s s n
P P P P P P
α α α α α α↑
≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ −
 = − − −  ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑    
The higher states are weighted less in this example when, 1α > . 
Similarly, we define another probability vector, P↓ , for decumulative outcomes 
1 nx x≥ ≥  as follows: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2
1 12 1 2 1
, , ,
, , , ,1 .
P
T
n
T
s s s ss s n s n s n
P P P
f P f P f P f P f P f P
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
≤ ≤ − ≤ − ≤ −
=
 = − − − ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑


 (25) 
If the agent is uncertainty averse, higher states are weighted more. This approach is 
also the method proposed by Yaari (1987) to deal with the violation of continuity and 
monotonicity in Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory.  
We therefore have the following lemma showing that Choquet expectation has 
an expected utility solution, but with a transformed probability measure on ordered 
utilities. 
 
Lemma 2.  Suppose P  is an additive probability measure for any capacity 
( )v f µ=  that is well supported by the probability measure µ  and for any 
nonnegative function nu +∈ . Then the Choquet integral has a rank-dependent 
expected utility representation: 
 ( )
1
u P
n
T
s s s
s
u v ds u P↑ ↑
=
= =∑∫ , if u  is weakly increasing in s ,  (26) 
 ( )
1
u P
n
T
s s s
s
u v ds u P↓ ↓
=
= =∑∫ , if u  is weakly decreasing in s , (27) 
where P↑ and P↓ are state-reweighted probability vectors defined above. 
 
The proof of the lemma is in the appendix. With this result, if 1 1t itQ r+ +  is weakly 
increasing in 's , as can always be done by permutation, we have 
 1 , 1 1 , 1 '
' 1
1 1 .
n
C
it t t i t t i t s
s
E Q r Q r P↑+ + + +
=
 = − = −  ∑π   (28) 
If 1 , 1t i tQ r+ +  is weakly decreasing in 's , then 
 1 , 1 1 , 1 '
' 1
1 1 .
n
C
it t t i t t i t s
s
E Q r Q r P↓+ + + +
=
 = − = −  ∑π   (29) 
Therefore, in addition to deriving inequality bounds, we also have an alternative 
solution. Choquet expectation relative to v coincides with an expected utility model 
defined by ( )f ⋅ . This expected utility requires rank dependence, so that the product 
( ) ( )1 1' 't itQ s r s+ + must be either weakly increasing or weakly decreasing in 's . The 
correspondence between Choquet expectation and the rank-dependent 
representation does not always exist. Rather, the rank-dependent expected utilities 
are a special case of Choquet expected utility, a case in which the underlying 
probability measureµ  exists and contains sufficient information to define v .  
The Ellsberg paradox is a violation of this condition and therefore has no 
rank-dependence representation. In those cases, there does not exist an underlying 
measure, providing all we need to know about events. Potentially, Choquet 
expectation is more general, in that it allows us to work on scenarios during which 
our capabilities of defining probabilities are limited. 
Note that equation (20) also features a similar rank-dependent solution: 
 1 , 1 '
' 1
1
n
t j t s
s
Q r P↑+ +
=
=∑   if 1 , 1t j tQ r+ +  is weakly increasing in 's ,  (30) 
 1 , 1 '
' 1
1
n
t j t s
s
Q r P↓+ +
=
=∑   if 1 , 1t j tQ r+ +  is weakly decreasing in 's .  (31) 
These two equations provide a useful guidance for estimating the stochastic discount 
factor, when uncertainty aversion is involved. We can compare equation (20) with 
the classical asset pricing theory under additive priors. In that case, returns should 
follow 
 [ ]1 11 .t t tE Q r+ +=    (32) 
Then one dollar paid today is weighted against how many dollars or units of 
consumption the agent will get in return tomorrow. If the decision also involves 
attitudes towards uncertainty, we now see that (32) becomes [ ]1 11 .Ct t tE Q r+ +=    
With the implication of Lemma 2, it becomes clear that even if people manage to 
evaluate this true equation, as in (30) and (31), the result would still be a special case 
of our more general theory. 
 4. Monetary Asset Choice under Uncertainty Aversion: A No Trade 
Interval 
 
In this section we reverse the perspective by looking for the portfolio no trade 
region. Given that v  is a probability measure, the value of expected discounted real 
rate of return exhibits linearity and translation invariance; that is, 
1 , 1 1 , 1
C C
t t i t t t i tE Q r E Q r+ + + +   + = +   α β α β , if 0, .α β≥ ∈  But this property does not 
hold, when α  is negative. Therefore, we consider 1 , 1
C
t t i tE Q r+ + − −   instead, giving 
rise to the following lemma: 
  
Lemma 3.   If the agent is uncertainty averse, the Choquet expected value satisfies 
 1 , 1 1 , 1
C C
t t i t t t i tE Q r E Q r+ + + +   − − >    .  (33) 
 
The proof is in the appendix. Intuitively, adding a constant to a random variable 
or multiplying a random variable by a positive number will linearly shift the Choquet 
expectation. This relationship does not hold for negative multipliers. The 
nonadditivity of the probability causes an asymmetric effect, producing an interval 
within which there are no transactions of monetary asset i. There will be a range of 
discounted returns from 1 , 1
C
t t i tE Q r+ +    to 1 , 1
C
t t i tE Q r+ + − −  , within which the agent 
neither want to buy nor to sell the monetary asset. If the discounted return
1 , 1
C
t t i tE Q r+ +   is larger than 1, she will want to buy the monetary asset. If the 
discounted return 1 , 1
C
t t i tE Q r+ + − −   is lower than 1, she will want to sell this 
monetary asset (short). 
To prove this result, we assume the utility function, 0u ≥ , is twice continuously 
differentiable with ' 0u >  and '' 0.u <  We use Jensen's inequality to prove this 
result. But first we need to determine the conditions under which Jensen's 
inequalities holds under a nonadditive probability measure. 
 
Lemma 4.  Let ( ), ,VS F   be a nonadditive probability space, 's S∈ . Suppose
( )1 'tQ s+   and ( ), 1 'i tr s+  are both Choquet integrable, where u  is a concave 
function on [ )0,+∞ , and 
1. ( ) ;u t t≥   
2. ( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ){ }' ' ' ' ' ' , 0.v s Q s r s t v s u Q s r s t t> ≥ > ∀ ≥     
Then Jensen’s inequality follows: 
 ( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ){ }' ' ' ' .C Ct tu E Q s r s E u Q s r s≥         (34) 
Proof:  
 
( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( )( ){ }
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ){ }
0
0
0
0
' ' ' ' '
' ' '
' ' '
' ' '
' ' .
C
t
C
t
u E Q s r s u v s Q s r s t dt
u v s Q s r s t dt
v s Q s r s t dt
v s u Q s r s t dt
E u Q s r s
+∞
+∞
+∞
+∞
= >  
 ≥ > 
≥ >
≥ >  
=   
∫
∫
∫
∫
  (35) 
 
Since the integrals on the right hand side are all Riemann, the second line holds, 
because u  is concave. The third line holds because of condition 1, ( )u t t≥ . The 
last inequality holds because of the condition 2.                             ∎ 
 
In additive probability, Jensen's inequality is equivalent to the concavity of the 
function. But when the probability is non-additive, concavity needs to interact with 
the "nonlinearity" of the probability. The function will need to be more concave to 
offset the probabilistic nonlinearity and still have some concavity left. Hence, 
Jensen’s inequality imposes restrictions on both utility and probability.  If u is 
convex, the additional conditions we need are ( )u t t≤ and 
( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ){ }' ' ' ' ' ' .v s Q s r s t v s u Q s r s t> ≤ >    
We now have the main result, as follows: 
 
Theorem 5.  Consider a risk neutral or risk averse agent with wealth, tW , who is 
considering investing itm  in a monetary asset, yielding a real rate of return , 1i tr + . 
Suppose the two conditions in Lemma 4 are satisfied. Denoting the Choquet expected 
discounted rate of return by 1 , 1
C
t t i tE Q r+ +   , she will buy this monetary asset, if 
1 , 11
C
t t i tE Q r+ + <   , or equivalently if 0.itπ <  She will sell the asset (short), if 
1 , 11
C
t t i tE Q r+ + > − −  , or equivalently 1 , 1 1 , 1
C C
it t t i t t t i tE Q r E Q r+ + + +   > − − −   π .  
 
We only sketch the proof. Suppose the agent spends itm  on this monetary asset. 
Then by Jensen's inequality 
 { } { } ( )1 , 1 1 , 1 .C Ct t it it t i t t t it it t i t tE u W m m Q r u E W m m Q r u W+ + + +   − + ⋅ ≤ − + ⋅ ≤      (36) 
The last inequality holds, if 1 , 1 1.
C
t t i tE Q r+ +  ≤   Therefore the individual is at least as 
well off not buying anything as holding a positive position in monetary asset i. 
Analogous arguments give rise to selling the asset, if 1 , 11
C
t t i tE Q r+ + > − −  . In this 
circumstance, 
 
1 , 1
1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 1
1
1 0.
C
t t i t
C C C
t t i t t t i t t t i t
E Q r
E Q r E Q r E Q r
+ +
+ + + + + +
  − − −  
      = − − − − + >      
  (37) 
Since 1 , 11
C
it t t i tE Q r+ + = −  π , this condition is equal to 
1 , 1 1 , 1
C C
it t t i t t t i tE Q r E Q r+ + + +   > − − −   π , and by Lemma 3 this difference is positive.  ∎ 
 
Hence 1 , 1 1 , 10,
C C
t t i t t t i tE Q r E Q r+ + + +    − − −      is a range of user costs with no 
trade under uncertainty aversion. If the user cost, itπ , is lower than zero, we 
conclude 1 , 11
C
t t i tE Q r+ + <   , so the return tomorrow is larger than the one dollar 
spent on the asset today, and she will buy it. If itπ  is larger than 
1 , 1 1 , 1
C C
t t i t t t i tE Q r E Q r+ + + +   − − −    , then [ ]1 11 Ct t itE Q r+ +> − −  and the uncertainty 
premium is not enough to compensate for the cost of holding the monetary asset. 
She will want to sell it. This range of user costs depends only on the beliefs and 
attitude towards uncertainty, not on the attitude towards risk. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper we consider monetary services aggregation theory under 
uncertainty, as distinguished by Knight (1921) from risk. The agent's attitude towards 
uncertainty is represented  by a probability measure that need not be additive, in 
accordance with Schmeidler (1986, 1989), Gilboa (1987, 2009), and Gilboa and 
Schmeidler (1989). We acquire three primary conclusions. First, different from 
CCAPM risk adjusted user costs incorporating covariances and subject to the “equity 
premium puzzle” critique, we find that the uncertainty adjusted user cost, in its most 
general form, produces boundaries. The previously derived perfect certainty user 
cost and the risk adjusted user cost are special cases of ours, if the probability 
measure becomes additive. Second, we are able to derive an expected utility 
analogous solution, using transformed additive probabilities. The resulting model of 
expectations is a special case of Choquet expectation. Third, user costs under 
uncertainty produce an interval within which no transactions of monetary assets will 
occur.  This effect is brought about solely by uncertainty aversion, not by risk 
aversion captured by the utility function.  The resulting behavioral corner solutions 
are not produced or explained by conventional expected utility maximization 
solutions for monetary asset service user costs. 
While our approach does not resolve all of the objections to expected utility 
maximization in the behavioral economics literature, the approach using Choquet 
expectations has established connections with the method proposed by Yaari (1987) 
to deal with the violation of continuity and monotonicity discussed in Kahneman and 
Tversky's (1979), and is consistent with the use of Choquet integration in Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992). 
Appendix  
Proof of Theorem 1:  
Let 
1t
u
c +
∂
∂
 and , 1i tr +  be comonotonic in the sense that for each pair of states, 
1 2', ' ,s s S∈   
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 , 1 1 , 1 2
1 1
' ' ' ' 0.i t i t
t t
u us s r s r s
c c + ++ +
 ∂ ∂
 − − ≥   ∂ ∂ 
  
Suppose , 1
1
C
t i t
t
uE r
c ++
 ∂
< ∞ ∂ 
 and both , 1
1
, 0.i t
t
u r
c ++
∂
≥
∂
 For any given 0 ',s  we have by 
comonotonicity 
 ( ) ( )0 1 , 1 0
1 1
' ' 0.it i t
t t
u u s r r s
c c + ++ +
 ∂ ∂
 − − ≥   ∂ ∂ 
  
That is 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 1 0 , 1 0 0 , 1 , 1 0
1 1 1 1
' ' ' ' .i t i t i t i t
t t t t
u u u ur s r s s r r s
c c c c+ + + ++ + + +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
+ ≥ +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
  
Since Choquet expectation is monotone, we have 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 1 0 , 1 0 0 , 1 , 1 0
1 1 1 1
' ' ' ' .C Ct i t i t t i t i t
t t t t
u u u uE r s r s E s r r s
c c c c+ + + ++ + + +
   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
+ ≥ +   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   
  
Given 0 ',s  ( )0
1
'
t
u s
c +
∂
∂
, and ( ), 1 0 'i tr s+ are constants. By translatability, we have8 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 1 0 , 1 0 0 , 1 , 1 0
1 1 1 1
' ' ' ' .C Ct i t i t t i t i t
t t t t
u u u uE r s r s v E s r r s
c c c c+ + + ++ + + +
   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
+ ≥ +   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   
  
                                                             
8 Choquet integrals are translatable for any real number β, such that ( ) ( ) ,C Ct tE X E X v+ = +β β  if v  
is a monotone measure on the measurable space (S,ℱ). 
By positive homogeneity, since ( )0
1
'
t
u s
c +
∂
∂
 and ( ), 1 0 ' 0,i tr s+ ≥  we have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 1 0 , 1 0 0 , 1 , 1 0
1 1 1 1
' ' ' ' ,C C Ct i t i t t i t i t t
t t t t
u u u uE r s r s v s E r r s E
c c c c+ + + ++ + + +
   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
+ ≥ +   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   
 
and this holds for any 0 ' .s S∈ That is, 
 ( ), 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
1 1 1 1
.C C Ct i t i t t i t i t t
t t t t
u u u uE r r v E r r E
c c c c+ + + ++ + + +
   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
+ ≥ +   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   
  
When both ( ), 1Ct i tE r +  and 
1
C
t
t
uE
c +
 ∂
 ∂ 
 are finite, apply translatability again to 
acquire 
 ( ) ( ), 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
1 1 1 1
.C C C C C Ct i t t i t t t i t t i t t
t t t t
u u u uE r v E r v E E r E r E
c c c c+ + + ++ + + +
       ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
+ ≥ +      ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂       
  
Dividing the norm on both sides, we find 
 ( ), 1 , 1
1 1
1 .C C Ct i t t t i t
t t
u uE r E E r
c v c+ ++ +
   ∂ ∂
≥   ∂ ∂   
  
Since v  is a probability measure, 1v = . This proves part 1 of the theorem. 
If v  is submodular and
1t
u
c +
∂
∂
and , 1i tr +  are countermonotonic, the second part 
of the theorem follows from the same logic.                              ∎ 
 
Proof of Lemma 2:  
Suppose u  is weakly increasing in .s S∈  Given a monotone measure space,
( ), ,S F V , we denote { } ( ){ }su t s u s t≥ = ≥ for any 0t > . The Choquet integral of u
over S  with respect to a real monotone measure v  is 
 ( ) { }( )
{ }( ) { }( ) { }( )
{ }( ) { }( ) ( )
( )
1
1
1
1
0
0
2
0
2
1 1
2
1
1 2
1, 2, , , 1, ,
s
s n
s
s n
s i
nu u
i i iu u
s
nu u
u u
s
n
i s s i
i s i s
n n
s i s i
s i s s i s
u v ds v i u t dt
v i u t dt v i u t dt v i u t dt
v n dt v s s n dt v dt
u f P u u f P
u f P u f P
φ
−
−
+∞
+∞
=
+∞
=
−
= ≥
−
= ≥ = ≥
= ≥
= ≥ + ≥ + ≥
= + + +
   
= + −   
   
   
= −   
   
∫ ∫
∑∫ ∫ ∫
∑∫ ∫ ∫
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
 
( )
1
.
n n s i s i
s n i s s n i s
n
s s
s
u f P u f P u f P
u P
< ≥ < >
↑
=
   
= + −   
   
=
∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑
  
The weakly decreasing case of u can be proven likewise.                 ∎ 
 
Proof of Lemma 3: Now we prove the fact that 1 , 1 1 , 1 .
C C
t t i t t t i tE Q r E Q r+ + + +   − − >      
Denoting by ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 , 1' ' ' ,t i tA t s S Q s r s t+ += ∈ ≥ we find 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )01 , 1 0' ' 1 .
C
t t i tE Q s r s v A t dt v A t dt
+∞
+ + −∞
   = − +   ∫ ∫   
Based on the definition ( ) ,A t  consider the event ( ) ( )1 , 1' 't i tQ s r s t+ +− >  so that 
 
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ){ }
( )
( )
1 , 1
1 , 1
' ' '
' ' '
\
.
t i t
t i t
c
s S Q s r s t
s S Q s r s t
A t
A t
+ +
+ +
∈ − >
= ∈ < −
= Ω −
= −
  
Here the superscript lower case c means complement of ( )A t− . It should not be 
confused with the upper case C superscipt notation for Choquet. We have therefore 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
0
1 , 1 0
0
0
0
0
' ' 1
1
1 .
c cC
t t i t
c c
c c
E Q s r s v A t dt v A t dt
v A z dz v A z dz
v A t dt v A t dt
+∞
+ + −∞
−∞
∞
+∞
−∞
  − = − − + −   
 = − − −
 
 = + −
 
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
  
Furthermore, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 , 1 1 , 1' ' ' 'C Ct t i t t t i tE Q s r s E Q s r s+ + + +   + −     yields 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )
1 , 1 1 , 1' ' ' '
1 ,
C C
t t i t t t i t
c
E Q s r s E Q s r s
v A t v A t dt
+ + + +
+∞
−∞
   + −   
 = + −
 ∫
  
by the fact that the probability is nonadditive. When the agent is uncertainty averse, 
( ) ( ) 1,cv A v A+ <  so that ( )( ) ( )( ) 1 0.cv A t v A t dt+∞−∞  + − < ∫  The conclusion of the 
lemma follows.                                     ∎ 
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